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Abstract. Tripartite (Diffie-Hellman) Key Exchange (3KE), introduced
by Joux (ANTS-IV 2000), represents today the only known class of group
key exchange protocols, in which computation of unauthenticated ses-
sion keys requires one round and proceeds with minimal computation
and communication overhead. The first one-round authenticated 3KE
version that preserved the unique efficiency properties of the original
protocol and strengthened its security towards resilience against leak-
age of ephemeral (session-dependent) secrets was proposed recently by
Manulis, Suzuki, and Ustaoglu (ICISC 2009).
In this work we explore sufficient conditions for building such pro-
tocols. We define a set of admissible polynomials and show how their
construction generically implies 3KE protocols with the desired security
and efficiency properties. Our result generalizes the previous 3KE proto-
col and gives rise to many new authenticated constructions, all of which
enjoy forward secrecy and resilience to ephemeral key-leakage under the
gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
1 Introduction
Key Exchange (KE) protocols are crucial research topics with direct practical
applications. Although KE was introduced back in 1976 [17], it was not until 1993
when Bellare and Rogaway [7] made the first step towards capturing the security
requirements for these protocols in a formal way. Research efforts on provable
security in KE protocols, in the public key setting, focused on two-party KE
(2KE), e.g. [14,24,15,25,32,37,16], and group KE (GKE), e.g. [10,29,22,12,31,19],
reaching out to other flavors such as password-based solutions [8,6,9,3] or flexible
combinations of GKE and 2KE [30,1]. The security notion, shared by most KE
flavors, takes its roots in [7] and is called authenticated key exchange (AKE)
security. Although AKE-security has been modeled for different types of adver-
saries, the common idea for secure key exchange is indistinguishability of a test
session key from a randomly chosen one.
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Tripartite Key Exchange. A powerful GKE subclass of tripartite KE (3KE)
emerged with the use of pairings in the work of Joux [20], where one communi-
cation round amongst three parties is sufficient to compute the session key. Each
party communicates only one group element and performs one exponentiation
and one pairing evaluation. The original protocol in [20] was unauthenticated
and so efforts were taken to achieve protection against active attacks, without
sacrificing the efficiency of the protocol. Adopting traditional authentication
techniques such as digital signatures, as previously applied to unauthenticated
2KE Diffie-Hellman in [14] or GKE in [21,13,22], would require at least two
rounds of communication to prevent replay attacks. 3KE protocols with at least
two communication rounds have also been known in other authentication set-
tings, e.g. with passwords [2]. The only way to preserve one communication round
with constant bit communication complexity from [20] is to resort to an implic-
itly authenticated solution, in which session key is derived through a mixing of
static (long-term) and ephemeral (session-dependent) secrets. Many attempts
to achieve such authentication in 3KE, e.g. [36,4,28,27,26] failed (as detailed
in [31]). So far the only implicitly authenticated 3KE protocol that provably
fulfills this goal is by Manulis, Suzuki, and Ustaoglu [31].
Ephemeral Key Leakage. The security model from [31], stated in a more gen-
eral GKE setting, considers a very strong attacker, that may adaptively com-
promise static and ephemeral secret keys used in the protocol sessions (with
the restriction that at least one key per participant remains secret). Leakage
of ephemeral secrets, typically the exponent used in computing the ephyemeral
Diffie-Hellman key, could be damaging for implicitly authenticated protocols,
where for better efficiency one may desire to pre-compute store ephemeral pub-
lic keys off-line. Even if ephemeral secret keys are chosen (and erased) within the
protocol session, attacks exploiting side-channels may threaten their secrecy. In
general, motivation for considering leakage of ephemeral secrets in KE protocols
stems from 2KE domain, e.g. as first mentioned in [14,24] and explicitly modeled
in AKE-security definitions from [25,37]. Various efforts towards construction of
2KE leakage-resilient protocols have been taken, e.g. [25,34,37,33,23,18]. In gen-
eral, modeling and designing ephemeral key-leakage resilient KE protocols should
not be taken for granted — Cremers [16] demonstrated how various technical
elements of 2KE models such as the notions of session ids and partnering as
well as conditions for freshness of the test session may affect the strength of
AKE-security definition with ephemeral key-leakage resilience, when it comes
to comparability of models and 2KE protocols. The model in [31] is so-far the
only GKE security model that focuses on ephemeral key-leakage in test sessions
and has recently been applied in [38], for the analysis of a two-round explicitly
authenticated ephemeral key-leakage resilient GKE protocol.
Sufficient Condition for Ephemeral Key-Leakage Resilience. Most of
KE designs focus on concrete constructions, aiming to achieve particular secu-
rity goals. Some goals can be obtained generically, using protocol compilers such
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as to add authentication (without ephemeral key leakage-resilience) to unauthen-
ticated KE protocols [22,13] or to obtain optional insider security [21,11,19] in
GKE protocols. Yet another interesting direction is to search for sufficient con-
ditions for achieving a security goal. Only recently, and for 2KE protocols only,
sufficient conditions for ephemeral key-leakage resilience (in the eCK model [25])
have been identified by Fujioka and Suzuki [18]. Their key observation is that
many eCK-secure implicitly authenticated 2KE protocols derive session keys
from a shared secret group element of the form gz, where g is the generator of a
cycling group of prime order q and the exponent z ∈ Z∗q can often be represented
as a function that “mixes” products of static and ephemeral private keys. The
authors introduced the concept of admissible polynomials over Zq to describe
which representations of z admit AKE-secure 2KE protocols in the eCK model,
by offering a general reduction algorithm to the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) [35]
problem (in the random oracle model). They could explain constructions of ex-
isting eCK-secure 2KE protocols and design new more efficient protocols. The
beauty of their approach is that instead of designing an eCK-secure 2KE protocol
from scratch it suffices to come up with a set of admissible polynomials.
OurContributions. We identify sufficient conditions for ephemeral key-leakage
resilience of (implicitly authenticated) one-round 3KE protocols, that is condi-
tions under which the protocol can achieve AKE-security (with forward secrecy)
from [31]. Technically, we build on the work from [18] and adopt their notion of
admissible polynomials. The main difference to the 2KE case is that we work with
three parties and that one-round 3KE protocols generally require bilinear maps,
and hence our definition of “admissible” is different. In particular, our admissible
polynomials are of degree three and involve six variables as opposed to polyno-
mials of degree two and four variables from [18]. We show that our conditions on
such polynomials are sufficient by providing a generic framework for the design
of implicitly authenticated one-round 3KE protocols with ephemeral key-leakage
resilience and forward secrecy in the model from [31] under the gap Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (gap BDH) assumption [5] in the random oracle model. This framework
explains the 3KE protocol from [31] and gives rise to many further 3KE proto-
cols, all of which are resilient to the leakage of ephemeral session secrets and enjoy
forward secrecy.
2 The Model and Security Definitions
We recall the security model from [31], termed g-eCK model. This model extends
strongly-authenticated key exchange model for two-party protocols from [32] to
the group setting and it is described using notations and terminology of the
state-of-the-art GKE model [19].
Protocol Participants and Initialization. Let U := {U1, . . . , UN} be a set of po-
tential protocol participants and each user Ui ∈ U is assumed to hold a static
private/public key pair (si, Si) generated by some algorithm Gen(1
κ) on a secu-
rity parameter 1κ during the initialization phase.
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Protocol Sessions and Instances. Any subset of U can decide at any time to
execute a new protocol session and establish a common group key. Participation
of some U ∈ U in multiple sessions is modeled through a number of instances
{ΠsU | s ∈ [1 . . . n], U ∈ U}, i.e., the ΠsU is the s-th session of U. Each instance is
invoked via a message to U with a partner id 1 pidsU ⊆ U , which encompasses the
identities of all the intended session participants (note that pidsU also includes
U). Then, we say that U owns the instance ΠsU . In the invoked session, Π
s
U
accepts if the protocol execution was successful, in particular ΠsU holds then the
computed group key KsU .
Session State. During the session execution, each participating ΠsU creates and
maintains a session id sidsU and an associated internal state state
s
U which in
particular is used to maintain ephemeral secrets used by ΠsU during the protocol
execution. We say that U owns session sidsU if the instance Π
s
U was invoked at U.
Note that the integer s is an internal parameter in the model, used to differentiate
amongst the invoked sessions at U, since at the onset of the instance, there may
not be enough information to create sidsU ; until sid
s
U is created, the instance is
identified via pidsU and the outgoing ephemeral public key which is unique per
user except with negligible probability. Furthermore, we assume that instances
that accepted or aborted delete all information in their respective states.
Partnering. Two instances ΠsU and Π
t
U∗ are called partnered or matching if
sidsU ⊆ sidtU∗ or sidtU∗ ⊆ sidsU and pidsU = pidtU∗ . The first condition models
the fact that if session ids are computed during the protocol execution, e.g., from
the exchanged messages, then their equality should be guaranteed only at the
end of the protocol, i.e., upon the acceptance of ΠsU and Π
t
U∗ .
Note also that the notion of partnering is self-inclusive in the sense that any
ΠsU is partnered with itself. If the protocol allows a user U to initiate sessions
with U, then the equality pidsU = pid
t
U∗ is a multi-set equality.
Adversarial Model. The adversary A, modeled as a PPT machine, can schedule
the protocol execution and mount own attacks via the following queries:
– AddUser(U, SU): This query allows A to introduce new users. In response,
if U ∈ U (due to the uniqueness of identities) then U with the static public
key SU is added to U ; Note that A is not required to prove the possession
of the corresponding secret key sU
2.
– Send(ΠsU ,m): With this query, A can deliver a message m to ΠsU whereby
U denotes the identity of its sender. A is then given the protocol message
generated by ΠsU in response to m (the output may also be empty if m
is not required or if ΠsU accepts). A special invocation query of the form
Send(U, (‘start’, U1, . . . , Un)) with U ∈ {U1, . . . , Un} creates a new instance
1 Invocation should include the order of users and perhaps some additional
information.
2 In our security argument, we will only assume that SU chosen by A must come from
the ephemeral public key space, e.g., element of G.
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ΠsU with pid
s
U = {U1, . . . , Un} and provides A with the first protocol mes-
sage.
– SessionKeyReveal(ΠsU): This query models the leakage of session group keys
and provides A with KsU . It is answered only if ΠsU has accepted.
– StaticKeyReveal(U): This query provides A with the static private key sU .
– StateReveal(ΠsU): A is given the ephemeral secret information contained in
statesU at the moment the query is asked. Note that the protocol specifies
what the state contains.
– Test(ΠsU): This query models the indistinguishability of the session group
key according to the privately flipped bit τ . If τ = 0 then A is given a
random session group key, whereas if τ = 1 the real KsU . The query can be
queried only once and requires that ΠsU has accepted.
Correctness. A GKE protocol is said to be correct if in the presence of a benign3
adversary all instances invoked for the same protocol session accept with the
same session group key.
Freshness. The classical notion of freshness of some instance ΠsU is traditionally
used to define the goal of AKE-security by specifying the conditions for the
Test(ΠsU) query. For example, the model in [22] defines an instance Π
s
U that has
accepted as fresh if none of the following is true: (1) at some point, A asked
SessionKeyReveal to ΠsU or to any of its partnered instances; or (2) a query
StaticKeyReveal(U∗) with U∗ ∈ pidsU was asked before a Send query to ΠsU or
any of its partnered instances.
Unfortunately, these restrictions are not sufficient for our purpose since ΠsU
becomes immediately unfresh if the adversary gets involved into the protocol
execution via a Send query after having learned the static key sU∗ of some user
U∗ those instance participates in the same session as ΠsU .
The recent model in [12] defines freshness using the additional AddUser and
StateReveal queries as follows. According to [12], an instance ΠsU that has ac-
cepted is fresh if none of the following is true: (1) A queried AddUser(UM , SUM )
with some U∗ ∈ pidsU ; or (2) at some point, A asked SessionKeyReveal to ΠsU or
any of its partnered instances; or (3) a query StaticKeyReveal(U∗) with U∗ ∈ pidsU
was asked before a Send query to ΠsU or any of its partnered instances; or (4) A
queried StateReveal to ΠsU or any of its partnered instances at some point after
their invocation but before their acceptance.
Although this definition is already stronger than the one in [22] it is still
insufficient for the main reason that it excludes the leakage of ephemeral se-
crets of instances in the period between the protocol invocation and acceptance.
Also this definition of freshness does not model key compromise impersonation
attacks.
The recent update of the freshness notion in [19] addressed the lack of key
compromise impersonation resilience. In particular, it modifies the above con-
dition (3) by requiring that if there exists an instance ΠtU∗ which is partnered
3 Benign adversary executes an instance of the protocol and faithfully delivers mes-
sages without any modification.
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with ΠsU and A asked StaticKeyReveal(U∗) then all messages sent by A to ΠsU
on behalf of ΠtU∗ must come from Π
t
U∗ intended for Π
s
U . This condition should
allow the adversary to obtain static private keys of users prior to the execution
of the attacked session while requiring its benign behavior with respect to the
corrupted user during the attack.
Yet, this freshness requirement still prevents the adversary from obtaining
ephemeral secrets of participants during the attacked session. What is needed is
a freshness condition that would allow the adversary to corrupt users and reveal
the ephemeral secrets used by their instances in the attacked session at will
for the only exception that it does not obtain both the static key sU∗ and the
ephemeral secrets used by the corresponding instance of U∗; otherwise security
can no longer be guaranteed. In the following we define freshness taking into
account all the previously mentioned problems.
Definition 1. An accepted instance ΠsU is fresh if none of the following is true:
1. A queried AddUser(U∗, SU∗) with some U∗ ∈ pidsU ; or
2. A queried SessionKeyReveal to ΠsU or any of its accepted partnered instances;
or
3. A queried both StaticKeyReveal(U∗) with U∗ ∈ pidsU and StateReveal(ΠtU∗)
for some instance ΠtU∗ partnered with Π
s
U ; or
4. A queried StaticKeyReveal(U∗) with U∗ ∈ pidsU and there exists no instance
ΠtU∗ partnered with Π
s
U .
Note that since U ∈ pidsU and since the notion of partnering is self-inclusive
Condition 3 prevents the simultaneous corruption of static and ephemeral secrets
for the corresponding instance ΠsU as well. In case when users are allowed to own
two partnering instances i.e., they can initiate protocols with themselves the last
condition should be modified to say that the number of instances of U equals the
number of times U appears in pidsU . Note also that the above definition captures
key-compromise impersonation resilience through Condition 4: A is allowed to
corrupt participants of the test session in advance but then must ensure that
instances of such participants have been honestly participating in the test session.
In this way we exclude the trivial break of security where A reveals static keys of
users prior to the test session and then actively impersonates those users during
the session. On the other hand, as long as A remains benign with respect to
such users their instances will still be considered as fresh.
Definition 2 (g-eCK Security). Let P be a correct GKE protocol and τ be
a uniformly chosen bit. We define the adversarial game Gameake-τA,P (κ) as fol-
lows: after initialization, A interacts with instances via queries. At some point,
A queries Test(ΠsU), and continues own interaction with the instances until it
outputs a bit τ ′. If ΠsU to which the Test query was asked is fresh at the end of
the experiment then we set Gameake-τA,P (κ) = τ
′. We define
AdvakeA,P(κ) = |2Pr[τ = τ ′]− 1|
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and denote with AdvakeP (κ) the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries
A. We say that a GKE protocol P provides g-eCK security if this advantage is
negligible.
3 Sufficient Condition for Secure Tripartite Protocols
We identify now sufficient conditions for a 3KE protocol to satisfy g-eCK security
from Definition 2. Technically, we build upon [18] and their notion of admissible
polynomials. We extend definition of admissible polynomials to account for the
specifics of 3KE protocols and then present a framework for the generic design
of g-eCK secure one-round 3KE protocols out of those polynomials.
3.1 Admissible Polynomials
We define admissible polynomials in Definition 3 with respect to multivariate
polynomials with six variables over Zq and state three conditions that, as we
will see, are sufficient for building g-eCK secure one-round 3KE protocols. The
first condition from Definition 3 says that each term of polynomial p(i) has
degree three and that either u0 or u1, either v0 or v1, and either w0 or w1
appear in each term. The second condition says that there exist four polynomials
p(i), p(j), p(k), p(l) such that the four corresponding vectors of the coefficients of
their terms containing a specific variable, are linearly independent. The third
condition says that for each polynomial p(i) the corresponding polynomial, which
consists of the terms containing specific variables, is a product of three linear
polynomials.
Definition 3 (Admissible Polynomials). We say m (m ≥ 4) polynomials
p(i) ∈ Zq[u0, u1, v0, v1, w0, w1] (i = 1, ...,m) are admissible if the following con-
ditions are satisfied.
1. For any i (= 1, ...,m), the following condition holds
p(i)(u0, u1, v0, v1, w0, w1) =
∑
α,β,γ=0,1
d
(i)
α,β,γuαvβwγ ,
where d
(i)
α,β,γ ∈ Zq.
2. We denote
V
(i)
α,∗,∗ = (d
(i)
α,0,0, d
(i)
α,0,1, d
(i)
α,1,0, d
(i)
α,1,1),
V
(i)
∗,β,∗ = (d
(i)
0,β,0, d
(i)
0,β,1, d
(i)
1,β,0, d
(i)
1,β,1),
V
(i)
∗,∗,γ = (d
(i)
0,0,γ , d
(i)
0,1,γ , d
(i)
1,0,γ , d
(i)
1,1,γ).
For any α (= 0, 1), there exist distinct indices i, j, k, l (1 ≤ i < j < k < l ≤
m), s.t.
V
(i)
α,∗,∗, V
(j)
α,∗,∗, V
(k)
α,∗,∗, V
(l)
α,∗,∗
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are linearly independent, and for any β (= 0, 1), there exist distinct indices
i, j, k, l (1 ≤ i < j < k < l ≤ m), s.t.
V
(i)
∗,β,∗, V
(j)
∗,β,∗, V
(k)
∗,β,∗, V
(l)
∗,β,∗
are linearly independent, and for any γ (= 0, 1), there exist distinct indices
i, j, k, l (1 ≤ i < j < k < l ≤ m), s.t.
V
(i)
∗,∗,γ , V
(j)
∗,∗,γ , V
(k)
∗,∗,γ , V
(l)
∗,∗,γ
are linearly independent.
3. We denote
P
(i)
α,∗,∗ = d
(i)
α,0,0uαv0w0 + d
(i)
α,0,1uαv0w1 + d
(i)
α,1,0uαv1w0 + d
(i)
α,1,1uαv1w1,
P
(i)
∗,β,∗ = d
(i)
0,β,0u0vβw0 + d
(i)
0,β,1u0vβw1 + d
(i)
1,β,0u1vβw0 + d
(i)
1,β,1u1vβw1,
P
(i)
∗,∗,γ = d
(i)
0,0,γu0v0wγ + d
(i)
0,1,γu0v1wγ + d
(i)
1,0,γu1v0wγ + d
(i)
1,1,γu1v1wγ .
For any i (= 1, ...,m), the following condition holds: for any α (= 0, 1),
P
(i)
α,∗,∗ is expressed as
P
(i)
α,∗,∗ = 
(i)
α,∗,∗(u0, u1)
′(i)
α,∗,∗(v0, v1)
′′(i)
α,∗,∗(w0, w1),
where 
(i)
α,∗,∗(u0, u1), 
′(i)
α,∗,∗(v0, v1), 
′′(i)
α,∗,∗(w0, w1) are linear combinations of
(u0, u1), (v0, v1), (w0, w1), respectively, and for any β (= 0, 1), P
(i)
∗,β,∗ is
expressed as
P
(i)
∗,β,∗ = 
(i)
∗,β,∗(u0, u1)
′(i)
∗,β,∗(v0, v1)
′′(i)
∗,β,∗(w0, w1),
where 
(i)
∗,β,∗(u0, u1), 
′(i)
∗,β,∗(v0, v1), 
′′(i)
∗,β,∗(w0, w1) are linear combinations of
(u0, u1), (v0, v1), (w0, w1), respectively, and for any γ (= 0, 1), P
(i)
∗,∗,γ is
expressed as
P
(i)
∗,∗,γ = 
(i)
∗,∗,γ(u0, u1)
′(i)
∗,∗,γ(v0, v1)
′′(i)
∗,∗,γ(w0, w1),
where 
(i)
∗,∗,γ(u0, u1), 
′(i)
∗,∗,γ(v0, v1), 
′′(i)
∗,∗,γ(w0, w1) are linear combinations of
(u0, u1), (v0, v1), (w0, w1), respectively.
In Section 3.2 we construct a g-eCK secure 3KE protocol from admissible polyno-
mials, where parties compute m shared secrets Zi = g
p(i)
T (= 1, ...,m). The above
three conditions will be utilized in the security proof of the designed protocol.
Roughly, the first condition ensures that each user is able to compute the shared
secret group elements. The second condition enables the simulator to extract
a BDH solution from the challenge test session. The third conditions ensures
simulator can verify that shared secret group elements are correctly formed. We
refer to the proof of Theorem 1 for further details and provide in the following
some examples of admissible polynomials.
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Example 1
p(1) = u0v0w0, p
(2) = u0v0w1, p
(3) = u0v1w0, p
(4) = u0v1w1,
p(5) = u1v0w0, p
(6) = u1v0w1, p
(7) = u1v1w0, p
(8) = u1v1w1.
Example 2
p(1) = u0v0w0 + u1v1w1, p
(2) = u0v1w1 + u1v0w0,
p(3) = u1v0w1 + u0v1w0, p
(4) = u1v1w0 + u0v0w1.
Example 3. This example essentially explains the construction behind the one-
round 3KE protocol by Manulis, Suzuki, and Ustaoglu [31].
p(1) = (u0 +Du1)(v0 + v1)(w0 + w1), p
(2) = (u0 + u1)(v0 + Ev1)(w0 + w1),
p(3) = (u0 + u1)(v0 + v1)(w0 + Fw1), p
(4) = (u0 +Du1)(v0 + Ev1)(w0 + Fw1),
where D,E, F = 1.
Example 4
p(1) = (u0 + u1)(v0 + v1)(w0 + w1) , p
(2) = u0v1w1 + u1v0w0,
p(3) = u1v0w1 + u0v1w0 , p
(4) = u1v1w0 + u0v0w1.
3.2 Proposed 3KE Protocol
We now propose the 3KE protocolΠp(1),...,p(m) constructed from admissible poly-
nomials p(i) (i = 1, . . . ,m). We then prove in Theorem 1 that if polynomials p(i)
(i = 1, . . . ,m) satisfy the conditions of admissible polynomials, the proposed
3KE protocol Πp(1),...,p(m) is g-eCK secure, i.e., we provide a sufficient condition
for building g-eCK secure 3KE protocols.
The proposed 3KE protocol Πp(1),...,p(m) is described as follows. Let p
(i) (i =
1, . . . ,m) be admissible polynomials. Let κ be the security parameter. Let G and
GT be cyclic groups of prime order q. Let e : G×G → GT be a non-degenerate
bilinear map, called pairing, from group G × G to group GT . Let g and gT =
e(g, g) be a generator of G and GT , respectively. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}κ be
cryptographic hash function modeled as a random oracle. Let P be the protocol
identifier of the protocol Πp(1),...,p(m) .
For a user UA, we set UA’s static and ephemeral keys A0 = g
a0 and A1 = g
a1 ,
respectively, and the lowercase letters are the private keys.
In the description, users UA, UB, and UC communicate with each other, and
compute the session key.
1. UA selects a random ephemeral private key a1 ∈U Zq, computes the ephemeral
public keyA1 = g
a1 , stores ephemeral private key a1 as state information, and
broadcasts (P, (UA, UB, UC), UA, A1) to UB and UC .
2. UB selects a random ephemeral private key b1 ∈U Zq, computes the
ephemeral public key B1 = g
b1 , stores ephemeral private key b1 as state
information, and broadcasts (P, (UA, UB, UC), UB, B1) to UC and UA.
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3. UC selects a random ephemeral private key c1 ∈U Zq, computes the
ephemeral public key C1 = g
c1 , stores ephemeral private key c1 as state
information, and broadcasts (P, (UA, UB, UC), UC , C1) to UA and UB.
4. Upon receiving (P, (UA, UB, UC), UB, B1) and (P, (UA, UB, UC), UC , C1), UA
verifies B1, C1 ∈ G, computes m shared secrets
Zi =
∏
β,γ=0,1
e(Bβ, Cγ)
(d
(i)
0,β,γa0+d
(i)
1,β,γa1) (i = 1, . . . ,m),
obtains the session key K = H(Z1, . . . , Zm,P, UA, A0, A1, UB, B0, B1, UC ,
C0, C1), and completes the session.
5. Upon receiving (P, (UA, UB, UC), UC , C1) and (P, (UA, UB, UC), UA, A1), UB
verifies C1, A1 ∈ G, computes m shared secrets
Zi =
∏
γ,α=0,1
e(Cγ , Aα)
(d
(i)
α,0,γb0+d
(i)
α,1,γb1) (i = 1, . . . ,m),
obtains the session keyK = H(Z1, . . . , Zm,P, UA, A0, A1, UB, B0, B1, UC , C0,
C1), and completes the session.
6. Upon receiving (P, (UA, UB, UC), UA, A1) and (P, (UA, UB, UC), UB, B1), UC
verifies A1, B1 ∈ G, computes m shared secrets
Zi =
∏
α,β=0,1
e(Aα, Bβ)
(d
(i)
α,β,0c0+d
(i)
α,β,1c1) (i = 1, . . . ,m),
obtains the session key K = H(Z1, . . . , Zm,P, UA, A0, A1, UB, B0, B1, UC ,
C0, C1), and completes the session.
All users UA, UB, and UC compute the same shared secrets
Zi = g
p(i)(a0,a1,b0,b1,c0,c1)
T (i = 1, . . . ,m),
and so compute the same session key K.
The outlined 3KE protocol Πp(1),...,p(m) requires exactly m shared secrets, 4
pairing operations at most, and 4m+1 exponential operations at most (including
the exponentiation for the ephemeral public key).
3.3 Security
For the security of the proposed protocol, we need4 the gap Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (gap BDH) assumption [5] described below. Let BCDH : G3 → GT
s.t. BCDH(gu, gv, gw) = e(g, g)uvw, and BDDH : G4 → {0, 1} be a predicate
which takes an input (gu, gv, gw, e(g, g)x) and returns bit 1 if uvw = x mod q
and bit 0 otherwise. An adversary A is given input U, V,W ∈U G selected uni-
formly random and oracle access to BDDH(·, ·, ·, ·) oracle, and tries to compute
BCDH(U, V,W ). For adversary A, we define advantage
4 Gap BDH assumption is used since in bilinear groups no BDDH oracle is available.
Using twin BDH technique we could also rely on BDH instead of gap BDH.
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AdvgapBDH(A) = Pr[U, V,W ∈R G,ABDDH(·,·,·,·)(U, V,W ) = BCDH(U, V,W )],
where the probability is taken over the choices of U, V,W and A’s random tape.
Definition 4 (gap BDH assumption). We say that G and GT satisfy the
gap BDH assumption if, for all polynomial-time adversaries A, advantage
AdvgapBDH (A) is negligible in security parameter κ.
Theorem 1. If G and GT are groups where the gap BDH assumption holds,
H is a random oracle, and p(i) (i = 1, . . . ,m) are admissible polynomials, the
proposed 3KE protocol Πp(1),...,p(m) constructed from p
(i) (i = 1, . . . ,m) is secure
in the g-eCK model.
Proof (Sketch). From the first condition of admissible polynomials, all users UA,
UB, and UC can compute the shared secrets as follows. User UA, who knows
secret keys a0, a1, can compute shared secrets
Zi =
∏
β,γ=0,1
e(Bβ , Cγ)
(d
(i)
0,β,γa0+d
(i)
1,β,γa1) = g
∑
α,β,γ=0,1 d
(i)
α,β,γaαbβcγ
T ,
user UB, who knows secret keys b0, b1, can compute shared secrets
Zi =
∏
γ,α=0,1
e(Cγ , Aα)
(d
(i)
α,0,γb0+d
(i)
α,1,γb1) = g
∑
α,β,γ=0,1 d
(i)
α,β,γaαbβcγ
T ,
and user UC , who knows secret keys c0, c1, can compute shared secrets
Zi =
∏
α,β=0,1
e(Aα, Bβ)
(d
(i)
α,β,0c0+d
(i)
α,β,1c1) = g
∑
α,β,γ=0,1 d
(i)
α,β,γaαbβcγ
T .
The gap BDH solver S extracts the answer guvwT of an instance (U = gu, V =
gv,W = gw) of the gap BDH problem using adversary A. For instance, we as-
sume the case that test session sid∗, owner of which is user UA, has no partnered
sessions sid∗, owners of which are users UB and UC , adversaryA is given a0, and
adversary A does not obtain a1, b0 and c0 from the condition of the freshness.
In this case, solver S can perfectly simulate StaticKeyReveal query by selecting
random a0 and setting A0 = g
a0 , and solver S embeds the instance as A1 = U
(= gu), B0 = V (= g
v) and C0 = W (= g
w) to extract guvwT from the shared
secrets Zi = g
p(i)
T (i = 1, . . . ,m).
From the second condition of admissible polynomials, solver S can extract the
answer of the gap BDH instance as follows. From the second condition, there
exist i, j, k, l (1 ≤ i, j, k, l ≤ m), s.t., V (i)1,∗,∗, V (j)1,∗,∗, V (k)1,∗,∗, and V (l)1,∗,∗ are linearly
independent. Using knowledge of a0, solver S can compute
Z ′I = g
a1(d
(I)
1,0,0b0c0+d
(I)
1,0,1b0c1+d
(I)
1,1,0b1c0+d
(I)
1,1,1b1c1)
T
= ZI/(e(B0, C0)
d
(I)
0,0,0a0e(B0, C1)
d
(I)
0,0,1a0e(B1, C0)
d
(I)
0,1,0a0e(B1, C1)
d
(I)
0,1,1a0)
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for the indices I = i, j, k, l. Solver S can compute ga1b0c0T from Z ′i, Z ′j , Z ′k, Z ′l since
V
(i)
1,∗,∗, V
(j)
1,∗,∗, V
(k)
1,∗,∗, and V
(l)
1,∗,∗ are linearly independent, and successfully outputs
the answer ga1b0c0T = g
uvw
T of the gap BDH problem.
From the third condition of admissible polynomials, solver S can check
whether the shared secrets are correctly formed w.r.t. static and ephemeral pub-
lic keys, and can simulateH and SessionKeyReveal queries consistently. More pre-
cisely, in the simulation of the H(Z1, . . . , Zm,P, UA, A0, A1, UB, B0, B1, UC , C0,
C1) query, solver S must check that the shared secrets Zi (i = 1, . . . ,m) are cor-
rectly formed, and if so return session keyK that is consistent with the previously
answered SessionKeyReveal(P, UX , UA, A0, A1, UB, B0, B1, UC , C0, C1) (X =
A,B,C) queries. For all i (= 1, . . . ,m), solver S performs the following pro-
cedure. Using the knowledge of a0, solver S can compute
Z ′i = g
a1(d
(i)
1,0,0b0c0+d
(i)
1,0,1b0c1+d
(i)
1,1,0b1c0+d
(i)
1,1,1b1c1)
T
= Zi/(e(B0, C0)
d
(i)
0,0,0a0e(B0, C1)
d
(i)
0,0,1a0e(B1, C0)
d
(i)
0,1,0a0e(B1, C1)
d
(i)
0,1,1a0)
Then, solver S can check if shared secret Z ′i is correctly formed w.r.t. the static
and ephemeral public keys, by asking BDDH oracle
BDDH(g
(i)
1,∗,∗(a0,a1), g
′(i)
1,∗,∗(b0,b1), g
′′(i)
1,∗,∗(c0,c1), Z ′i) = 1,
since the third condition of admissible polynomials holds, and this implies Zi
is correctly formed. Here solver S can compute g(i)1,∗,∗(a0,a1), g′(i)1,∗,∗(b0,b1), and
g
′′(i)
1,∗,∗(c0,c1), since 
(i)
1,∗,∗(a0, a1), 
′(i)
1,∗,∗(b0, b1), and 
′′(i)
1,∗,∗(c0, c1) are linear.
	unionsq
4 Conclusion
We presented a sufficient condition for constructing one-round ephemeral key-
leakage resilient 3KE protocols where parties are equipped with a static public
key and an ephemeral public key, each comprised of only one group element,
and where key derivation is performed via a single call to the hash function,
modeled as a random oracle. Technically, the proposed 3KE protocol can be
seen as a combination of several two-dimensional versions of the original (unau-
thenticated) tripartite key exchange protocol from [20]. The protocol gives rise
to a framework for the design of efficient ephemeral key-leakage resilient one-
round 3KE protocols in the model from [31] by choosing different admissible
polynomials. The amount of work for proving security of all those protocols es-
sentially reduces to proving that chosen polynomials are admissible according to
the conditions stated in this paper.
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